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Abstract. Quantitative security analysis evaluates and compares how effectively a
system protects its secret data. We introduce QUAIL, the first tool able to perform
an arbitrary-precision quantitative analysis of the security of a system depending
on private information. QUAIL builds a Markov Chain model of the system’s
behavior as observed by an attacker, and computes the correlation between the
system’s observable output and the behavior depending on the private information,
obtaining the expected amount of bits of the secret that the attacker will infer by
observing the system. QUAIL is able to evaluate the safety of randomized protocols
depending on secret data, allowing to verify a security protocol’s effectiveness.
We experiment with a few examples and show that QUAIL’s security analysis is
more accurate and revealing than results of other tools.
1 Introduction
The Challenge. Qualitative analysis tools can verify the complete security of a protocol,
i.e. that an attacker is unable to get any information on a secret by observing the system—
a property known as non-interference. Non-interference holds when the system’s output
is independent from the value of the secret, so no information about the latter can be
inferred from the former [20]. However, when non-interference does not hold, qualitative
analysis cannot rank the security of a system: all unsafe systems are the same.
Quantitative analysis can be used to decide which of two alternative protocols is more
secure. It can also asses security of systems that are insecure, but nevertheless useful,
in the qualitative sense, such as a password authentication protocol, for which there
is always a positive probability that an attacker will randomly guess the password. A
quantitative analysis is challenging because it is not sufficient to find a counterexample to
a specification to terminate. We need to analyze all possible behaviors of the system and
quantify for each one the probability that it will happen and how much of the protocol’s
secret will be revealed. So far no tool was able to perform this analysis precisely.
Quantitative analysis with QUAIL. We use Quantified Information Flow to reduce
the comparison of security of two systems to a computation of expected amount of
information, in the information-theoretical sense, that an attacker would learn about the
secret by observing a system’s behavior. This expected amount of information is known
as information leakage [9,15,8,12,21] of a system. It amounts to zero iff the system is
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non-interfering [15], else it represents the expected number of bits of the secret that the
attacker is able to infer. The analysis generalizes naturally to more than two systems,
hence allowing to decide which of them is less of a threat to the secrecy of the data.
To compute information leakage we use a stochastic model of a system as observed
by the attacker. The model is obtained by resolving non-determinism in the system code,
using the prior probability distribution over the secret values known to the attacker before
an attack. Existing techniques represent this with a channel matrix from secret values
to outputs [5]. They build a row of the channel matrix for each possible value of the
secret, even if the system would behave in the same way for most of them. In contrast,
we have proposed an automata based technique [3], using Markovian models. One state
of a model represents an interval of values of the secret for which the system behaves in
the same way, allowing for a much more compact and tractable representation.
We build a Markov chain representing the behavior observed by the attacker, then
we hide the states that are not observable by the attacker, obtaining a smaller Markov
chain—an observable reduction. Then we calculate the correlation between the output
the attacker can observe and the behavior dependent on the secret, as it corresponds
to the leakage. Since leakage in this case is mutual information, it can be computed
by adding the entropy of the observable and secret-dependent views of the system and
subtracting the entropy of the behavior depending on both. See [3] for details.
Fig. 1: Bit XOR leakage as a func-
tion of Pr(r = 1)
QUAIL (QUantitative Analyzer for Impera-
tive Languages) implements this method. It is the
first tool supporting arbitrary-precision quantita-
tive evaluation of information leakage for random-
ized systems or protocols with secret data, includ-
ing anonymity and authentication protocols. Sys-
tems are specified in a simple imperative modeling
language further described on QUAILS website.
QUAIL performs a white-box leakage analysis
assuming that the attacker has knowledge of the
system’s code but no knowledge of the secret’s
value, and outputs the result and eventually infor-
mation about the computation, including the Markov chains computed during the process.
Example. Consider a simple XOR operation example. Variable h stores a 1-bit secret.
The protocol generates a random bit r, where r = 1 with probability p. It outputs the
result of exclusive-or between values of h and r. The attacker knows p and can observe
the output, so if h = r, but not the values of r or h.
If p = 0.5 the attacker cannot infer any information about h, the leakage is zero bits
(non-interference). If p = 0 or p = 1 then she can determine precisely the value of h, and
thus the leakage is 1 bit. This can be verified efficiently with language-based tools like
APEX [10]. However, QUAIL is the only tool able to precisely compute the leakage for
all possible values of p with arbitrary precision. Figure 1 shows that XOR protocol leaks
more information as the value of r becomes more deterministic. For instance p = 0.4 is
safer than p = 0.8.
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2 QUAIL Implementation
The input model is specifed in QUAIL’s imperative language designed to facilitate suc-
cinct and direct modeling of protocols, providing features such as arbitrary-size integer
variables and arrays, random assignments, while and for loops, named constants and
conditional statements. Figure 2 presents the input code for the bit XOR example.
For a given input code QUAIL builds an annotated Markov chain representing
all possible executions of the protocol, then modifies it to encode the protocol when
observed by the attacker whose aim is to discover the protocol’s secret data. Finally,
QUAIL extracts a model of the observable and secret-dependent behavior of the system,
and computes the correlation between them, which is equivalent to the amount of bits of
the secret that the attacker can infer by observing the system. We now discuss QUAIL
implementation following the five steps of the method proposed in [3]:
Step 1: Preprocessing. QUAIL translates the input code into a simplified internal lan-
guage. It rewrites conditional statements and loops (if, for and while) to conditional
jumps (if-goto) and substitutes values for named constant references.
Step 2: Probabilistic symbolic execution. QUAIL performs a symbolic forward ex-
ecution of the input program constructing its semantics as a finite Markov chain (a
fully probabilistic transition system) with a single starting state. To this end, QUAIL
needs to know the attacker’s probability distributions over the secret variables. For each
conditional branch, we compute the conditional probability of the guard being satisfied
given the values of the public variables and the probability distributions over the secret
variables. Then QUAIL generates two successor states, one for the case in which the
guard is satisfied and one when not satisfied. This is the most time-consuming step, so
QUAIL uses an on-the-fly optimization to avoid building internal states that would be
removed in the next step. For instance, it does not generate new states for assignments
to a non-observable public variable. Instead it changes the value of the variable in the
current state.
Step 3: State hiding and model reduction. To represent what the attacker can examine,
QUAIL reduces the Markov chain model by iteratively hiding all unobservable states. For
the standard attacker, these are all the internal states, i.e. all the states except the initial
and the output states. A state is hidden by creating transitions from its predecessors to its
successors and removing it from the model. This operation normally eliminates more
than 90% of the states of the Markov chain model, building its observable reduction.
This operation also detects non-terminating loops and collapses then in a single non-
termination state. States are equipped with a list of their predecessors and successors to
quicken this step. An observable reduction looks like a probability distribution from the
starting states to the output states, since all other states are hidden.
Step 4: Quotienting. Recall from Sect.1 that we have to quantify the correlation between
the observable and secret-dependent views of the system. QUAIL relies on the notion
of quotients to represent different views of the system and compute their correlation.
A quotient is a Markov chain obtained by merging together states in the observable
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1 observable in t1 l ; / / b i t l i s the output
2 public in t1 r ; / / b i t r i s random
3 secret in t1 h ; / / b i t h i s the secre t
4 random r := randombit ( 0 . 5 ) ; / / randomize r
5 i f ( h== r ) then / / c a l cu l a t e the XOR
6 assign l : =0 ;
7 else
8 assign l : =1 ;
9 f i
10 return ; / / te rmina te
1 observable in t1 l ;
2 public in t1 r ;
3 secret in t1 h ;
4 random ( r ) := randombit ( 0 . 5 ) ;
5 i f ( ( h ) ==( r ) )
6 then goto 8;
7 else goto 10;
8 assign ( l ) : = ( 0 ) ;
9 goto 11;
10 assign ( l ) : = ( 1 ) ;
11 return ;
Fig. 2: Bit XOR example: input code (on the left) and preprocessed code (on the right).
reduction that give the same value to some of the variables. QUAIL quotients the
observable reduction separately three times to build three different views of the system.
QUAIL uses the attacker model again to know which states are indistinguishable as
they assign the same values to the observable variables. These states are merged in the
attacker’s quotient. Similarly, in the secret’s quotient states are merged if they have the
same possible values for the secret, while in the joint quotient states are merged if they
both have the same values for the secret and cannot be discriminated by the attacker.
Since information about the states’ variables is not needed to compute entropy, quotients
carry none, reducing time and memory required to compute them.
Step 5: Entropy and leakage computation. The information leakage can be computed
as the sum of the entropies of the attacker’s and secret’s quotients minus the entropy
of the joint quotient [3]. The three entropy computations are independent and can be
parallelized. QUAIL outputs the leakage with the desired amount of significant digits and
the running time in milliseconds. If requested, QUAIL plots the Markov chain models
using Graphviz.
3 On Using QUAIL
QUAIL is freely available from https://project.inria.fr/quail, including source code, bina-
ries and example files. We demonstrate usage of QUAIL to analyze the bit XOR example.
Let bit_xor.quail be the file containing the input shown in Fig. 2. The command
quail bit_xor.quail -p 2 -v 0
executes QUAIL with precision limited to 2 digits (-p 2), suppressing all output except
the leakage result (-v 0). In response QUAIL generates a file bit_xor.quail.pp with
the preprocessed code shown in Fig. 2, analyzes it and finally answers 0.0 showing
that in this case the protocol leaks no information (so non-interference). For different
probability of the random bit r in line 4 QUAIL obtains a different leakage (cf. Fig. 1).
For instance, for p = 0.8 the leakage is ∼0.27807 bits.
4 Comparison with Other Tools
QUAIL precisely evaluates the value of leakage of the input code. This not only allows
proving non-interference (absence of leakage) but also enables comparing relative
safety of similar protocols. This is particularly important for protocols that exhibit
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Table 1: QUAIL analysis of the leakage in an authentication program
Password length 2 32 64 500
Leakage 8.11 · 10−1 7.78 · 10−9 3.54 · 10−18 1.52 · 10−148
inherent leakage, such as authentication protocols. For instance, with a simple password
authentication, the user inputs a password and is granted access privilege if the password
corresponds to the secret stored in the system. The chance of an attacker guessing a
password is always positive (although it depends on the password’s length). Also, even
if the attacker gets rejected she learns something about the secret—the fact that the
attempted value was not correct. QUAIL can quantify the precise leakage as a function
of the bit length of the password, as shown in Table 1.
Existing qualitative tools can establish whether a protocol is completely secure or not,
i.e. whether it respects non-interference. They cannot discriminate protocols that allow
acceptable and unacceptable violations of non-interference. APEX [10] is an analyzer
for probabilistic programs that can check programs equivalence, while PRISM [14] is a
probabilistic model-checker. With these tools authentication protocols will always be
flagged as unsafe, and a comparison between them is impossible.
QUAIL can be used also to analyze anonymity protocols, like the grade protocol and
the dining cryptographers [6]. The interested reader can find discussion and input code
for these examples on the QUAIL website. These protocols provide full anonymity on
the condition that some random data is generated with a uniform probability distribution;
their effectiveness in these cases can be efficiently verified with the qualitative tools
above. If the probability distribution over the random data is not uniform some private
data is leaked, and QUAIL is again the only tool that can quantify this leakage. Presently,
the models for these protocols tend to grow exponentially, so the analysis becomes
time-consuming already for about 6–7 agents.
Qualitative tools and technique are more closely related to QUAIL; we present some
of them and discuss the main differences. It is worth noting that most of them either do
not work for analyzing probabilistic programs [1,11,13,17] or are based on a channel
matrix with an impractical number of lines [4,7].
JPF-QIF [19] is a tool that computes an upper bound of the leakage by estimating the
number of possible outputs of the system. JPG-QIF is much less precise than QUAIL,
and it is not able for instance to prove that the security of an authentication increases by
increasing the password size.
McCamant and Ernst [16] and Newsome, McCamant and Song [18] propose quanti-
tative extensions of taint analysis. This approach, while feasible even for large programs,
still does not allow to analyze probabilistic programs, making it unsuitable for security
protocols.
Bérard et al. propose a quantification of information leakage based on mutual infor-
mation, though they name it restrictive probabilistic opacity [2] and do not refer to some
of the core papers of the subject, like the works of Clark, Hunt and Malacaria [8,9]. The
approach tries to quantify leakage on probabilistic models, and is thus phylosophically
close to ours. They compute mutual information as the expected difference between
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prior and posterior entropy, and since the latter depends on all possible values of the
secret we expect that an eventual implementation would be in general very inefficient
compared to the QUAIL quotient-based approach.
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A Running QUAIL through an example
We detail in this appendix the result of the computations performed by QUAIL when
analyzing the bit XOR example presented in Fig. 2. We consider the value of 0.8 for the
random bit probability on line 4. We launch QUAIL as explained in Section 3:
quail bit_xor.quail -p 3 -v 0 -mc 0 1 2 3 4 -Tpdf
This will compute the leakage of the program with a precision of 3 digits for the
computations. Using the options -mc 0 1 2 3 4 -Tpdf it will also produce 5
Markov chains in a PDF format, corresponding to the different intermediate steps of the
computation. As a result the tool outputs the leakage of the program which is:
0.28
To compute this result Step 1 converts the input program given on the left of Fig. 2
into a preprocessed program shown on the right. This program is written in a separate
file bit_xor.quail.pp.
In Step 2, QUAIL parses the preprocessed code and builds the Markov chain model
shown in Fig. 3 that corresponds to all the executions of the program. Note that public
variables are labeled with a precise value in each state (e.g. l=0) while private variables
have intervals of allowed values (e.g. h=[0,1]).
Fig. 3: Bit XOR example: Markov chain model of the program
In Step 3, QUAIL hides all non observable states, i.e. the internal states, and produces
a Markov chain with only transitions between the initial states and the output states, as
shown in Fig. 4.
In Step 4, QUAIL computes the quotient Markov chains. In the attacker’s quotient,
since in both states s13 and s14 the observable variable l equals to 1, these two states are
merged together, and similarly for the states s12 and s16 in which l = 0. The result is
shown in Fig. 5a.
In the secret’s quotient, the states s12 and s14 share the value h = 0 for the secret
variable, whereas the states s13 and s16 share the value h = 1. These states are merged
together as shown in Fig. 5b.
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Fig. 4: Bit XOR example: observable reduction of the Markov chain model
Finally, in the joint quotient, we consider the intersection of the two previous dis-
crimination relations, i.e. only states with the same value to both observable and secret
variables can be merged together. This is not the case for any state in the observable
reduction, and therefore the joint quotient Markov chain shown in Fig. 5c is similar to
the original observable reduction of Fig. 4.
In the final Step 5, QUAIL computes the entropy of the three quotients Markov
chains. The entropy of the attacker’s quotient is:
Ha = −0.5 ∗ log(1/0.5)− 0.5 ∗ log(1/0.5) = 1
The entropy of the secret’s quotient is the same:
Hs = −0.5 ∗ log(1/0.5)− 0.5 ∗ log(1/0.5) = 1
The entropy of the joint quotient is:
Hj = −0.4 ∗ log(1/0.4) ∗ 2− 0.1 ∗ log(1/0.1) ∗ 2 = 1.058 + 0.664 = 1.722
The information leakage is the sum of the first two entropies minus the entropy of the
joint quotient, therefore:
L = Ha +Hs −Hj = 2− 1.722 = 0.278
This result is rounded to 0.28 in the final output.
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(a) Attacker’s quotient (b) Secret’s quotient (c) Joint quotient
Fig. 5: Markov chains of the quotients
B QUAIL imperative language
B.1 Variable declarations
All variables in QUAIL are fixed sized integers. They are declared at the beginning of
the program. Constants can be declared in the following manner:
const N := 4;
They are replaced by their value during the preprocessing step.
Public variables are either public or observable. In the latter case the attacker will be
able to distinguish their value. They are declared in the following manner:
public int4 var; or observable int4 var;
declares a 4 bits integer variable whose name is var, either public or observable.
public int4 var := 5;
declares var and initializes it to value 5. Any expression can be used to initialized a
variable, provided that the variables used in the expression are public or constants and
have been previously declared. Variables not initialized are implicitly initialized to the
value 0.
Private variables are either private or secret. The attacker will only infer knowledge
on the latter. They are declared in the following manner:
private int4 var; or secret int4 var;
declares a 4 bits integer variable whose name is var, either private or secret.
private int4 var := [0,1][2,5];
declares var and restricts its range to the two intervals [0,1] and [2,5]. Again any
expression can be used in the bounds of the intervals.
B.2 Arrays
Variables can also be arrays of integers and multi-dimensional arrays. Arrays are declared
in addition to the integer type of a variable.
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public array[4] of int4 tab;
declares a public variable tab that is an array of 4 bits integer of size 4 whose indices
range from 0 to 3, while
public array[1..4] of int4 tab;
declares tab as an array of size 4 whose indices range from 1 to 4. The size of an array
can be any expression that evaluates to an integer.
Arrays are replaced during the preprocessing. Therefore, an array variable named
tab, whose indices range from 0 to 3, declares 4 variables, whose name are tab[0],
tab[1], tab[2] and tab[3]. They have the same publicity and the same integer
type as the array.
An array may be initialized with a set of initial values:
public array[1..4] of int4 tab := {1,1,2,2};
initializes tab such that tab[1] and tab[2] are equal to 1, while tab[3] and
tab[4] are equal to 2. Private arrays can be initialized like any private variable, with a
set of intervals:
private array[1..4] of int4 tab := [0,1];
In that case all the variables in the array are initialized to the same range of integers.
B.3 Expressions
Expressions are used in guards, assignments, variables initialization and arrays indices.
Binary operators (||,&&,^,+,-,*,/ and %) and unary operators (-,!) can used. Classical
operators precedence is assumed. For boolean operations integer variables are considered
as a true value if non null, and false if null. Only public variables, constants and integers
can be used in expressions.
B.4 Guards
Guards are limited to a single comparison between a variable on the left side (either
public, or private, or constant, or an integer value) and an expression on the right side.
Any comparison operator among <,>,<=,>=,== and != can be used.
B.5 Assignments
An assignment statement is written in the following manner:
assign var := expr;
where var is a public variable (possibly with indices) and expr is an expression
containing no private variables.
B.6 Random assignments
The program can used two types of random primitives to assign values to a variable.
random var := random(expr_min,expr_max);
assigns to a public variable var a random value, chosen between the values of expr_min
and expr_max, with a uniform probability distribution.
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random var := randombit(p);
where p is a float value lower than 1, assigns to a public variable var a random bit value,
that is 0 with probability p, and 1 with probability 1− p.
B.7 IF statements
IF conditional statements starts with the keyword if, possibly followed by elif and
else, and ends with fi. The consequent statements are listed after the keyword then.
For example the following structures are allowed:
if (h <= l) then assign var:=1;
fi




if (h <= l) then assign var:=1;
elif (h==l) then assign var:=2;
fi
if (h <= l) then assign var:=1;
elif (h==l) then assign var:=2;




Conditional WHILE loop starts with the keyword while, followed by a guard, and the
statements included in the loop are listed between the keywords do and od. For example
the following structure is allowed:
while (h <= l) do
assign l := 1;
assign var := 2;
od
B.9 FOR statements
A FOR loop can be used to browse all the elements of an array. The syntax is:
for (var in tab) do
assign var := var+1;
od
The variable var is a local variable that must only be used inside the loop. It will take
successively each value in the array tab. Note that if tab is a multi-dimensional array
var is also an array.
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B.10 Return statements
The program ends when a return statement is reached. Its syntax is simply:
return;
C Further examples
C.1 The Grade protocol
In the Grades protocol a group of k students s1, ..., sk is given each a secret grade gi
between 0 and m-1. The students want to compute the sum of their grades without
disclosing them. To this aim they produce k random numbers between 0 and n =
(m− 1) ∗ k + 1 such that the number ri is known only to the students si and s(i+1)%k.
Then each student si outputs a number di = gi + ri − r(i+1)%k, and the sum of all
grades is equivalent to the sum of the outputs modulo n. The input code for the Grade
protocol is shown on Fig. 6 on the left.
To prove the security of the protocol, and thus the secrecy of the grades, we need
to show that the information the attacker gains by knowing the declarations and the
sum is the same as the information he would gain by knowing only the sum; the input
code for the latter system is shown in Fig. 6 on the right. The leakage of the protocol
for different numbers of students and grades is shown in Table 2(a); the leakage of the
protocol declaring only the final sum is shown in Table 2(b). The tables are identical,
demonstrating that when the attacker knows the students’ declarations and the sum of
the grades, she does not learn more information than the sum of the grades.
Table 2: Grades: leakage tables for attacker knowing a) the outputs and b) the sum only
(a) Students





2 1.500 1.811 2.030 2.198
3 2.197 2.525 2.745 2.910
4 2.655 2.984 3.201 3.365
5 2.999 3.325 3.541 timeout
(b) Students





2 1.500 1.811 2.030 2.198
3 2.197 2.525 2.745 2.910
4 2.655 2.984 3.201 3.365
5 2.999 3.325 3.541 timeout
C.2 The Dining Cryptographers protocol
The Dining Cryptographers protocol is an anonymity protocol in which a number of
agents collaborate to a shared computation depending on each agent’s secret [6]. A
group of n cryptographers is dining around a round table. At the end of the dinner,
the waiter informs them that the bill has already been settled by someone who would
prefer to remain anonymous. The cryptographers respect the payer’s wish for anonymity,
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1 / / S i s the number o f s tudents
2 const S:=2 ;
3 / / G i s the number o f grades ( from 0 to G
−1)
4 const G:=2 ;
5 / / n i s the number o f poss ib le random
numbers generated
6 public int32 n ;
7 / / t h i s i s the sum tha t w i l l be p r i n t ed
8 observable int32 output ;
9 / / t h i s i s an i n t e r n a l counter f o r the sum
10 public int32 sum:=0 ;
11 / / these are the random numbers ; each one
i s shared between two students
12 public array [S ] of int32 numbers ;
13 / / these are the pub l i c announcements o f
each student
14 observable array [S ] of int32 announcements
;
15 / / there are S secre t votes , each one wi th
G poss ib le values :
16 secret array [S ] of int32 h := [0 ,G−1];
17 / / these are j u s t counters
18 public int32 i : =0 ;
19 public int32 j : =0 ;
20
21 / / c a l c u l a t i n g n
22 assign n : = ( (G−1)*S) +1;
23
24 / / generate the random numbers
25 for (num in numbers ) do
26 random num:=random (0 , n−1) ;
27 od
28
29 / / producing the dec la ra t i ons according to
the secre t value
30 while ( i <S) do
31 assign j : =0 ;
32 while ( j <G) do
33 i f ( h [ i ]== j ) then
34 assign announcements [ i ] : = ( j +numbers [ i
]−numbers [ ( i +1)%S ] )%n ;
35 f i
36 assign j := j +1;
37 od
38 assign i := i +1;
39 od
40
41 / / computing the sum, producing the output
and te rm ina t i ng
42 for ( a in announcements ) do
43 assign sum := sum+a ;
44 od
45 assign output := sum%n ;
46
47 return ;
1 / / S i s the number o f s tudents
2 const S:=2 ;
3 / / G i s the number o f grades ( from 0
to G−1)
4 const G:=2 ;
5 / / t h i s i s the sum tha t w i l l be
p r i n t ed
6 observable int32 output ;
7 / / t h i s i s an i n t e r n a l counter f o r the
sum
8 public int32 sum:=0 ;
9 / / there are S secrets , each one wi th
G poss ib le values :
10 secret array [S ] of int32 h := [0 ,G
−1];
11 / / these are j u s t counters
12 public int32 i : =0 ;
13 public int32 j : =0 ;
14
15 / / computing the sum of the secre ts
16 while ( i <S) do
17 assign j : =0 ;
18 while ( j <G) do
19 i f ( h [ i ]== j ) then
20 assign sum := sum + j ;
21 f i
22 assign j := j +1;
23 od
24 assign i := i +1;
25 od
26
27 / / producing the output and te rm ina t i ng
28 assign output := sum;
29
30 return ;
Fig. 6: Grade example: input code for Grade (on the left) and for a protocol revealing
only the sum of the grades (on the right).
but would like to know whether the benefactor is one of them or an external party. To
determine this, each pair of adjacent cryptographers toss a coin hidden from everybody
else, so that each cryptographers knows the value of the coin to its left and to its right.
Then each cryptographers declares aloud the exclusive OR of the two coins he sees, i.e.
0 if they have the same value and 1 otherwise. If one of the cryptographers is the payer,
he declares the opposite. In the end, if an even number of ones is declared then someone
else paid the bill, while if an odd number of ones is declared one of the cryptographers
is the benefactor.
Figure 7 on the left shows the QUAIL input code for the Dining Cryptographers
protocol. The leakage of the protocol depends on the randomness of the coin that the
cryptographers toss; as the coin become more deterministic, so the probability of getting
a head gets closer to 0 or 1, the attacker is more able to determine the identity of the payer.
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Some results are shown in Fig. 7 on the right; for different numbers of cryptographers
we show that as the probability of the coin toss approaches 0 or 1 the leakage increases.
When it is 0 or 1 the leakage is equivalent to the bit size of the secret, i.e. the logarithm
in base 2 of n+ 1, proving that the whole secret gets leaked, and thus the attacker learns
the identity of the payer, whoever he is.
1 / / N i s the number o f cryptographers a t the
tab l e
2 const N:=3 ;
3
4 / / t h i s b i t represents the output
5 observable in t1 output ;
6
7 / / these b i t s represent the co in tosses
8 public array [N] of in t1 co in ;
9
10 / / these are the observable coins
11 observable array [ 2 ] of in t1 obscoin ;
12
13 / / t h i s i s j u s t a counter
14 public int32 i : =0 ;
15
16 / / these b i t s represent the b i t s declared
by the three cryptographers
17 observable array [N] of in t1 dec l ;
18
19 / / the secre t has N+1 poss ib le values :
20 / / 0 i f someone else paid
21 / / 1 i f Cryptographer A paid
22 / / 2 i f Cryptographer B paid
23 / / 3 i f Cryptographer C paid
24 / / . . . and so on
25 secret int32 h := [0 ,N ] ;
26
27 / / t oss ing the coins
28 for ( c in co in ) do
29 random c := randombit ( 0 . 5 ) ;
30 od
31
32 / / i f the a t t acke r i s one of the
cryptographers , he can observe two of
the coins .
33 / / To encode an ex te rna l a t t acke r comment
the next two l i n e s .
34 assign obscoin [ 0 ] : = co in [ 0 ] ;
35 assign obscoin [ 1 ] : = co in [ 1 ] ;
36
37 / / producing the dec la ra t i ons according to
the secre t value
38 while ( i <N) do
39 assign dec l [ i ] : = co in [ i ] ^ co in [ ( i +1)%N ] ;
40 i f ( h== i +1) then
41 assign dec l [ i ] : = ! dec l [ i ] ;
42 f i
43 assign i := i +1;
44 od
45
46 / / producing the output b i t and te rm ina t i ng
47 for ( d in dec l ) do













ty 0 2 2.32 2.59 2.81
0.1 1.76 1.90 2.03 2.15
0.3 1.56 1.49 1.45 1.41
0.5 1.50 1.37 1.25 1.15
0.7 1.56 1.49 1.45 1.41
0.9 1.76 1.90 2.03 2.15
1.0 2 2.32 2.59 2.81
Fig. 7: Dining Cryptographers example: input code for the Dining Cryptographers (on
the left) and leakage table as a function of the number of cryptographers and of the
probability of the random coin toss (on the right).
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